“Democracies die slowly”

Belén González, you research international security, peace and conflicts. We’re currently seeing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and a US government that is using the National Guard to crack down on immigrants and protesters in its own country. The impression you get is that violence is once again increasingly being used to resolve political problems. Is that the case?

Belén González: From an academic perspective, there are significant differences between these three situations. The war in Ukraine is an interstate conflict, and Gaza involves a kind of internal conflict within a state. We might be seeing a phase of repression by the government in the US. What all three cases have in common is that political actors see violence as a means of enforcing or achieving their political objectives. We know from research that in most cases, the use of political violence is based on a cold-blooded cost-benefit calculation.

What does this cost-benefit calculation entail?

González: All governments, whether they’re in a dictatorship or a democracy, essentially weigh up whether and to what extent it’s worth them resorting to violence. They won’t use force if the costs, for example resulting from the threat of sanctions or military intervention, are greater than the expected benefit, such as neutralizing political opponents. At the same time, we know that, on average, democracies are less willing to use violence than autocracies. This is due to two fundamental control mechanisms that make the use of force politically costly and therefore unattractive for democratic governments. The first mechanism is vertical control, which is exercised through free and fair elections. In democracies, governments that resort to violence or repression risk being voted out of office. The second mechanism is horizontal control, which is based on the independence of the courts. Representatives of the government must expect to face justice and be punished for their actions. 

Is this why autocracies are more inclined to use violence?

González: Exactly. By their very definition, autocracies don’t have free elections or independent courts. This removes any mechanisms of control or accountability that can apply sanctions if political violence is used. This makes it much more likely that autocrats will resort to violence and attack any unwelcome voices of opposition or critics of the regime, for example. Elections do of course also take place in autocracies, such as Russia, but they’re neither fair nor free – so they’re not lost by the incumbent governments and thus don’t act as a control mechanism. The same applies to the courts, which are no longer independent, as was the case under the Law and Justice (PiS) government in Poland. From a political science perspective, governments can essentially be placed on a spectrum ranging from self-contained autocracies at the one end to liberal, open democracies on the other. It’s important to understand that there are many different shades and gray areas in between. Countries can move up or down this spectrum, and we can see this in the case of Hungary or Turkey. These two countries have become more autocratic in recent years under the leadership of Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdogan – and this makes it more likely that political violence will be used. Unlike in the past, when democracies collapsed with a big bang, often following a military coup, today’s democracies die slowly.

Why do governments use violence?

González: We know from countless scientific studies that governments use violence when they feel they’re under fundamental threat politically. This may be the case, for example, after a terrorist attack or if there’s an armed uprising. Political violence and repression by the state are then designed to neutralize or at least weaken the other side, in this case the terrorist organization or the revolutionary movement. Incidentally, this doesn’t just apply to autocracies, but to democracies as well. In extreme situations, democracies can be just as violent as autocracies. 

Was one example the US response after the 9/11 terrorist attacks?

González: This is certainly an interesting example. From an academic standpoint, you can make a distinction between different forms of repression. On the one hand, there are violations of civil liberties. This entails restrictions on the right of assembly or freedom of expression – we’d call this a milder form of state repression. As we now know, the United States established a huge, transnational surveillance program in response to the attacks of 9/11. On the other hand, there are much more severe forms of state repression. These more fundamental human rights violations, which we may also refer to as “iron fist policies”, involve physical injury to people or even deaths. For instance, consider the torture program and the extrajudicial killings by drones that the United States engaged in after September 11.

Returning to our initial question: is it a trend that political violence is being used more frequently? 

González: I don’t think this is the case. Of course, we may feel that violence is on the rise because the conflicts we’ve mentioned have moved geographically closer or because they feature more in the media. But I’d warn against referring to this as a trend. Unfortunately, the use of violence as a means of achieving objectives is as old as humanity itself. The data obtained from research into conflicts over recent decades suggest the opposite is true – namely that the use of political violence is declining globally. But of course, this doesn’t mean that the situation won’t change again in the future. 
 

The impression we get is also that the international order is less stable today than it was in the decades after the Second World War. Do you share this assessment?

González: No, I would question that. We shouldn’t forget that fundamental components of the rules-based order are based on an opt-in principle. This means that states voluntarily choose not to behave in a certain way. But whether they ratify and abide by treaties and agreements designed to protect human rights or the inviolability of borders is a completely different question. What’s more, states have also repeatedly chosen not to sign up to certain agreements in the first place. Ultimately, international law has only a limited impact on how countries choose to behave. In essence, these are values that states decide to either embrace or not.

You say the international order has been fragile at other times in the past – has nothing changed compared to previous decades?

González: The United States, as the guardian of the rules-based order, has of course provided a certain stability, especially after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fact that this is now changing with the isolationist approach of the Trump administration is not that surprising, but it’s of course no less concerning from a European perspective. The rules-based order needs committed actors to enforce it.

Russia, Israel and even the US no longer seem to care about international rules and norms. What impact is this having?

González: The US has played a prominent role in creating the rules-based, some would say liberal, order. But the situation has changed since September 11, 2001. As America waged its “war on terror”, other countries began to question whether certain norms, such as respecting human rights, really need to be observed. With its actions, the US set a dangerous precedent that has caused lasting damage to the credibility of the rules-based order.

Let’s stick with the US. You also conduct research on internal conflicts and the use of violence within states. What we’re currently witnessing is the Trump administration using violence against civilians to push through its political agenda. Will this cost-benefit calculation work out, for example looking ahead to the midterm elections for the US Congress next year? 

González: It’s hard to say. Although we can observe an erosion of democratic institutions in the US, just like we can in other established democracies, as things stand today, the US is still a democracy. We previously mentioned the basic control mechanisms that exist in democratic regimes. If citizens disagree with the actions of the government, this should also be reflected in the next set of election results. At the same time, the current government is of course doing everything it can to secure its power over the long term. And with Project 2025, it’s pursuing an agenda that is toxic to the liberal elements within US democracy.

Trump talks openly about a third term. Do you expect him to stay in power like the leader he admires, Vladimir Putin?

González: I think that especially in the times we’re living in it’s a good idea not to take every statement made by a populist head of government at face value. We shouldn’t forget that Russia only became a democracy after the end of the Cold War. Putin came to power in 2000 and, despite high hopes, began to restructure the political system. But at this time, Russia wasn’t yet an established democracy with very strong institutions and resilient political control mechanisms – the situation in the US is very different. The US is an established democracy with a robust civil society and a free press. At the same time, of course, we’re seeing how the Trump administration is stretching the democratic institutions and in some cases is even trying to break them. However, I find it difficult to imagine that democracy will be eroded to such an extent that the limit on the term of office that the US President can serve will be removed. US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are also unlikely to accept this without objection, given their own political ambitions.

Is there a threat to democracy in the USA? 

González: We shouldn’t succumb to the temptation to think we live in a binary world in which a country is either a democracy or an autocracy. I’d like to return to the spectrum of political regimes I mentioned earlier. We know from research that very few countries, such as Denmark, Estonia, Switzerland and Norway, actually embody the ideal type of liberal democracy. Most other countries in the world are further removed from this ideal type. But this doesn’t mean that they’re necessarily autocracies or dictatorships. As long as the countries hold free and fair elections, they are electoral democracies, but some of them are also noted for their violations of people’s rights to privacy and freedom. In short, there are qualitative differences between democracies. We know from research that established democracies with robust institutions, a free press and an active civil society erode relatively slowly. However, this doesn’t mean that they can’t erode; and this does of course also apply to the political system in the United States.

Turning to our final topic: in the conflicts we mentioned at the start, violence is being used to resolve political conflicts. Does this work?

González: Research shows that political violence is in fact usually counterproductive in the long run. This is because the use of violence produces resistance both domestically and internationally. The problem is that governments, especially when they feel threatened, often focus on short-term political goals, while ignoring the negative consequences over the longer term. In addition, it’s impossible to rule out the possibility that politicians will simply miscalculate when it comes to using violence. 

Do you think that politics could become more predictable and less populist again?

González: I’m seeing an increasing nostalgia that is spreading in Western societies. Many people seem to think that things were more orderly and therefore more stable during the Cold War. There were two superpowers, two ideological poles, which behaved in ways that were predictable. However, I don’t think it felt like that for the parties involved at that time. It wasn’t a calm period. Just think of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Iranian Revolution and the countless proxy wars on the African and Latin American continents. We must accept that we live in dynamic times, and in democracies there can be changes of mood that may also be very severe. In view of the increasing economic inequality and polarization within Western societies, which feed authoritarian populism, I don’t anticipate that we’ll be seeing greater stability any time soon.

The current conflicts show that the existing order is being questioned and perhaps rearranged. Can you envisage that in the end some degree of clarity will emerge, with a new order that is stable again? 

González: The crucial question is who will create this new, stable order. As citizens of liberal democracies, we must be aware that authoritarian, illiberal states and political forces are currently setting out to create a new global order. This is backed up by scientific data. Consider what is known as the Iron Triangle consisting of China, Russia and Iran. It should be assumed that a new stable order would be authoritarian, illiberal and not bound by any rules – and this should act as an incentive for all democracies to defend the existing order as an attractive countermodel.