The Strength of a United Europe

Let’s start by going back 30 years. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama declared the ultimate triumph of liberalism and liberal democracy in his book The End of History. The countries of Eastern Europe were busy adopting democratic constitutions after breaking free of the diktat of the Soviet Union, and the United States was at the peak of its power. Pax Americana, which by then also extended across Eastern Europe, guaranteed the continent decades of peace, prosperity and low-cost defense, thanks to the United States and NATO.

But those certainties are now a thing of the past. Europe once again finds itself in a world that has become uncertain and unstable. The war in Ukraine and Russia’s imperial ambitions are posing a political, military and financial challenge for Europe. With Donald Trump in the White House, the United States could go from friend to foe. China is competing economically with Europe, most recently in cars and high tech. Meanwhile, support for populist parties is growing in many European countries. In some, populists are making a grab for power, while in others they have already seized it.

What is causing these problems and how can Europe address them?

Authoritarian populism is a global phenomenon. It can exist anywhere on the political spectrum. Current examples of authoritarian left-wing populist governments are Venezuela and Slovakia, while the US, Hungary and Italy are governed by right-wing populists. Up until the change of government just over a year ago, Poland also had a right-wing populist in power in the Law and Justice Party.

Populism is seen as a threat to liberal democracy and the rule of law. As it happens, Viktor Orbán in Hungary and the Law and Justice Party in Poland have systematically undermined both. And in the US, too, the Trump administration is attempting to remove checks on its power by Congress and the courts.

Why are democracy and populism incompatible? “Populists see themselves as representatives of the will of the people which must prevail against all odds,” explains UZH legal scholar Daniel Moeckli. They therefore view the rule of law – which is designed precisely to restrain political power and to protect minorities – as an obstacle to be removed. “But there is no such thing as ‘the people’ as a homogeneous unit with a fixed will,” says Moeckli. People’s opinions are diverse and political majorities can change. “The fundamental task of democracy is therefore to ensure that the minority can at any time become the majority – through open and fair elections or votes.”

That is precisely what authoritarian populists try to stop. They are elected democratically and then use their power to re-organize the state so that a change of government is either difficult or no longer possible. Attacks are directed in particular at the judiciary as a bastion of the rule of law. Without independent courts, other rule of law institutions can be undermined more easily. In Poland, for instance, the Law and Justice Party politicized the judiciary by filling the courts with loyalists. Following the change of power, the liberal government under Donald Tusk is trying to reverse these changes. But this is not easy, says Moeckli, especially if you want to adhere to rule of law principles.

Besides the judiciary, the media is another institution that keeps a close eye on and criticizes populists in power. Media outlets are thus made to toe the party line, for example by being sold to friends of the prime minister, as was the case in Hungary. Or they are bullied into submission. The same thing happens with civil society organizations and universities that criticize the system. For example, the Central European University in Budapest, founded by Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros, was forced out of the country by Orbán’s government.

Finally, fundamental rights can be restricted and electoral laws changed if the ruling party has the necessary majorities. “All the mechanisms that allow fair democratic processes are gradually eroded,” says Moeckli. Researchers call this democratic backsliding – the gradual dismantling of democratic institutions.

Is there a tipping point after which it is no longer possible to restore a democratic system? “If democracy is so severely undermined as it is in Hungary, any change will be difficult,” says Daniel Moeckli, “but ultimately it comes down to the citizens and how committed they are to democracy. If resistance is strong enough, an authoritarian regime can be overthrown, too.”

Why do authoritarian populist parties who want to upend democracy get elected? UZH political scientist Jonathan Slapin cites three reasons: frustration with the status quo, for example widespread corruption, as was the case in Hungary before Viktor Orbán came to power with his Fidesz party. Incidentally, Orbán himself has since put in place a highly corrupt regime.

Another reason for the backsliding is that democracies in Eastern Europe are not yet consolidated, says Slapin: “Having a democratic constitution and holding the odd free and fair election doesn’t make a country a stable democracy. This requires several free and fair elections. Such processes take decades.” It is therefore unsurprising that some Eastern European countries are relapsing into authoritarianism, says Slapin. “It would be quite amazing if all countries were to remain democratic.”

As well as established and generally-accepted political processes, prosperity also gives a country stability: “The more affluent a country is, the less likely it is that democracy will be called into question,” says Slapin. What happens next in the United States will show us whether this paradigm really holds water. Another problem is currently emerging there: Democracy depends on the attitude of the elites, says Slapin. It works as long as they adhere to democratic standards. “In the US, that’s no longer the case. The Republican Party has accepted that Trump is rolling back democratic norms.”

What could be done to counter the erosion of democracy? Daniel Moeckli has two answers: since 2021, the EU has had a new rule-of-law mechanism that allows it to cut EU funding to member states if they breach the rule of law. This mechanism has already been used against Hungary, with billions of euros being held back from the Cohesion Fund. The EU has even permanently withdrawn a chunk of the funds. Moeckli believes this is a powerful lever with which to put pressure on governments, as the EU funds are crucial to Hungary’s state budget. However, it remains to be seen whether the pressure is enough to make Orbán take rule of law issues seriously.

Democracy can also be strengthened through direct democratic mechanisms. This is shown by the research project led by Daniel Moeckli Popular Sovereignty vs. the Rule of Law? Defining the Limits of Direct Democracy, which received funding from the European Research Council (ERC). The project looked at what direct democratic instruments exist in the 46 countries of the Council of Europe, how they are regulated, and how they are used. Moeckli believes it is crucial that direct democratic participation is regulated by the rule of law and can be instigated by citizens themselves, as is the case with popular initiatives in Switzerland. If referendums could be ordered from above, the risk of misuse by populists would be high, as shown, for example, by the Brexit referendum in the UK and the referendum on EU migrant quotas in Hungary. “If direct democratic instruments do in fact allow burning issues to be addressed, they can have an important venting function,” says Moeckli. They prevent the anger from building and being harnessed by populist movements.

The right-wing and left-wing populist parties represent a new nationalism that puts the interests of the country in question above the common interests of the EU, and also pits the two against each other. This strategy was very successful for the proponents of Brexit. At the same time, Brexit and its impact on the United Kingdom serve as a cautionary tale for anyone toying with the idea of leaving the EU. “It showed how difficult and above all how expensive it is to leave the EU, even for a big European country that was always an outsider and didn’t even adopt the euro,” says Jonathan Slapin.

In addition, it’s difficult for the nationalist populists to work together as they only care about their own country’s interests. “If everyone is only out to get the maximum for themselves, it’s not long before cooperation falls apart,” says UZH political scientist Stefanie Walter. “This has been shown, for example, by the way in which Marine Le Pen has distanced herself from Donald Trump as the ‘America First’ policy doesn’t go down well in countries like France. This makes cooperation difficult, even between nationalist politicians.”

The big question is what would happen if the far right came to power in the EU’s two most important countries, Germany or France. At least in the case of Germany, political scientist Slapin considers this an unlikely scenario. “The AfD will struggle to garner 30% of the vote or more. So they could perhaps become a coalition partner in a government. But that wouldn’t mean that Germany would leave the EU or destroy the euro.” In France with its presidential system, the prospects are less certain because Marine Le Pen is in with a very real chance of winning the next presidential election. The question will then be whether the anti-far right front, which prevented the Rassemblement National winning the previous parliamentary elections, will hold up.

Jonathan Slapin points to a development that has become a problem for many European countries – the fragmented party-political landscape. In Germany in the 1970s, for example, there were the two major parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) and a smaller party (FDP) that would take turns to form a government. Today, there are seven parties in the Bundestag. France, the Netherlands and Austria are seeing similar trends. “This makes it difficult to form viable governments, as is currently the case in France and the Netherlands,” says Slapin.

Interestingly, the political views of voters haven’t shifted nearly as much as the new and diverse political landscape would suggest. “Surveys show that people’s fundamental preferences, for example in relation to migration and the EU, haven’t changed significantly in recent years, and are in fact very stable,” says Stefanie Walter, “but those who are skeptical about migration or the EU for a long time were lacking a strong political voice.” The new parties have changed that and have therefore also changed voting behavior.

Since the Second World War, (Western) Europe has been under the military protection of the United States. The US was a reliable partner, both politically and economically. With the Trump administration, for whom there are now only rivals and foes, that is over. “Research shows that it is fundamentally a good thing for countries to work together,” says Stefanie Walter, “which is why we’re losing something very valuable in the transatlantic partnership between the US and Europe.” Walter is doubtful as to whether the old friendly relations can be rapidly restored even after Trump’s term of office. “Europe would therefore do well to cut the cord and become strategically independent.”

This is particularly true for defense. Since the Second World War, Europe has become an economic juggernaut – the GDP of the 27 EU states equates to that of China – but a military lightweight. Under the protective shield of US-led NATO, European countries were able to spend their money on the welfare state, rather than investing in military armament. This will now have to change, which is going to be difficult and expensive. Above all, European countries need to work together much more closely, says Jonathan Slapin: “The EU countries need to pool their resources and develop a common security and defense policy.” This involves various obstacles, however, one of which being the fact that countries would have to give up some of their sovereignty. Are they willing to do so? Slapin is skeptical. “France, for example, is calling for a European army. But a European army according to French ideas and under French leadership. And would France hand over the control of its nuclear arms to a non-French military commando? Very unlikely.”

Overcoming nationalism in defense is likely to be more difficult than in economic affairs or migration. At any rate, Poland, Finland, Sweden and the Baltic states are now investing heavily in military armament. “And for the first time ever, German soldiers will be permanently stationed in Lithuania,” says Slapin. “Change happens slowly. But the major shock triggered by the US with its Ukraine policy and its clear shift away from the transatlantic friendship in recent weeks may now be the catalyst that really moves the dial.”

When it launched its attack on Ukraine, Russia upended the peaceful European order that has existed since World War II. Paradoxically, Russia has weakened itself in the process. “The war has definitely made Russia into China’s junior partner,” says Stefanie Walter, “meanwhile, China has not only surpassed Russia economically, but also militarily.” Without China’s support, Russia would probably not have been able to last as long as it has.

In economic terms, Russia ceased being a superpower long ago; its GDP equates roughly to that of Spain. Nonetheless, Russia is a massive threat to Europe, particularly for countries on the Russian border, such as the Baltic states, says Stefanie Walter. The Putin regime has shown that it is willing to pay a heavy price to gain territory to which it believes it can stake a claim. “This is possible because of the political structures in Russia, while European democracies would struggle to switch to a wartime economy.” Russia is already destroying critical infrastructures in Europe, for example through acts of sabotage in the Baltic Sea. However, Walter believes that the Ukraine war has made Europeans more united. “In the military field, they’re now talking about things that would have been inconceivable a few years back, such as the joint procurement of military equipment, and even a European army.” The attitude of the Trump administration towards Ukraine is hard for Europeans to stomach. Trump is increasingly siding with Russia and demanding an end to the war in Ukraine, while denying Europe or even Ukraine itself a seat at the negotiating table. The EU countries also have to consider whether Ukraine should become an EU member. “As I see it, there’s a general consensus that Ukraine should be a part of the EU,” says Stefanie Walter. But the path to get there will not be easy. To make it possible, the EU treaties would have to be adapted to ensure that the EU doesn’t become incapable of making decisions at any point in the future. At the same time, important reforms would be needed, such as in EU agricultural subsidies, which, under the current regulations, would virtually all go to Ukraine.

In light of the current geopolitical situation, Europeans must stand together, although internal differences mean this is no easy task. While the EU plays an important role, more and more formats now exist that involve non-EU countries such as the UK and Norway. Standing together would also mean “handing over more sovereignty to Brussels”, as Stefanie Walter puts it. This applies to foreign and security policy in particular. But perhaps this will work after all, precisely because the stakes are so high. “In the past, the EU has always managed to get its act together, even if this was often done on the basis of minimal consensus,” says Stefanie Walter.

Jonathan Slapin makes another suggestion: “European countries shouldn’t focus solely on economic growth but should pay more attention to the working classes. And the EU should maybe allow more state subsidies in certain fields.” This could temper the dissatisfaction of population groups that the populist parties are now successfully appealing to. However, it would be a departure from the liberal economic model that – together with globalization – has brought us very cheap consumer goods.